INTRODUCTION
In a short, but forcefid reply to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,' the Quaker United Nations Office/Friends World Committee for Consultation ended with the following statement:
"Indeed it might be helpful to rethink the language used to describe IPRS and call them instead intellectual property privileges, which is what they are, and thus remove the possible confusion with human rights."*
The present article will discuss this dminction between privileges and property rights, based on the evolving concepts of "privileges", "property rights" and "human rights". Based on an elaboration of these terms, it will analyse whether the term "privilege" is more appropriate than the term "right" in relation to intellectual property. Among the various categories of intellectual property rights (IPRs) , it will particularly assess the role of patents.
PRIVILEGES
Initially, certain activities which also represented intellectual efforts were rewarded by privileges granted by the State. These privileges granted permission to conduct a certain activity. What these privileges actually constituted is subject to much debate. One author finds that the granting of privileges &d not imply any possibility for the holder of the privilege to exclude others.4 However, in 1577, the Canton ofBerne in Switzerland granted a "permanent exclusive privilege" to the inventor Zobell.5 This must be understood as the possibility to exclude others through administrative and legal means.
Machlup finds that the privileges served different functions:
"Some privilegcs granted protection against imitation and . . . thus creatcd monopoly rights.
Others, however, granted protection from the restrictive regulations of guilds, and thus were designed to increase competition. Therefore, privileges comprised both exclusive and permissive elements. While the privileges were obviously subject to instrumentalist concerns and not necessanly based on objective criteria, as is the case for current patent protection,7 the notion that privileges are "primitive"8 is a view that deserves at least more consideration.
The English Statute of Monopolies of 1623 provides one example of how privileges were justified only if certain conditions were met.9 Article 1 states that "all grants ofmonopolies . . . are contrary to your majesty's law". However, Article 6(a) and (c) states that "the declaration before mentioned shall not extend to any letters patents Ibid., at pp. 1-2.
industrial application (usefulness).
' The eligibility criteria for a grant of patent protection are novelty, inventive step (non-obviousness) and History, Vol. 10, 1950, p. 2 (findmg that the 1623 Statute "grew directly out of the system of royal privileges").
[and] to the true and first inventor". As mentioned above, there were no listed criteria to identify the "true and first inventor".
The Constitution of the United States used the term "rights": "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respectful Writings and Discoveries."'o However, these were not rights in the modem understanding of IPRS. First, this right represented no transferable right over the intellectual property. Second, this right did not imply that the right holder could freely choose not to exercise hidher right; rather, there was a strong presumption that this right should be exercised. In modern patent law, there are no obligations to "work" a patent. The original justification for granting exclusive rights implied that rights were given in order to "promote the progress", not in order to restrict activities for this progress.
While the distinction between a right and a privilege can be held to be fundamental, there are authors who have dscussed the boundaries between rights and privileges and have found that rights can also be referred to as privileges.11 This distinction between privileges and rights wdl not be pursued here but, as will be argued in Section IV, a right can only be understood in relation to a corresponding obligation.
In summary, we see that privileges were granted by the State in order to serve given purposes. The privileges were upheld as long as it was felt that the original motivation was appropriately served. In other words, there was no "natural law" justification for these privileges but rather a strong instrumentalist purpose. In the field of copyrights, the justification was based more on moral arguments-in line with the principle later developed by Hegel regardmg the expression of the Self-and was less instrumentalist.12 111. PROPERTY RIGHTS Machlup and Penrose have noted:
" ... those who started to use the word property in connection with inventions had a very definite purpose in mind they wanted to substitute a word with a respectable connotation, 'property', for a word that had an unpleasant ring, 'privilege'."13
Intellectual property is an intangible category of property with boundaries that are not always clear cut and which must be actively defended by the holder against infringements. The basis for constituting a property right in the field of patents is that to The Constitution ofthe United States, adopted 1787, US. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., one can describe a new and applicable knowledge of a technological nature, not merely a new idea. Tangble property is visible and documented, and the boundaries are more easily given than for intellectual property.
A person who holds certain intellectual property will be able to defend this property only if he/she is granted a particular right over this property. In the field of patents, the rights are defined by the patent authorities based on what is defined in the patent claims. As with other property, one has to pay certain fees in order to have the property claim examined and determined. Unlike with other property rights, there is also an obligation to pay an annual maintenance fee in order to have a continuation of the right. Moreover, property rights over tangible property are indefinite, while IPRS are time-limited.
In order to gain a proper understanding of this particular category of property rights, it is crucial to bear in mind that it involves a right over an abstract object-a right which extends to embodiments of this new knowledge in a physical object.14 The development of the concept of property rights is not parallel for tangible property rights and for intangible property rights. The most important philosopher in the establishment and development of property rights is John Locke.15 At the time when Locke developed his well-known defense of the labour theory to just$ that man could claim property, there was no perception that the rights generated by patents actually constituted property rights.16 Therefore, the justification that Locke developed with regard to tangible property rights cannot be applied with regard to intangible property rights. However, contrary to this, Hughes finds that the justlfication of the labour theory applies particularly well to intellectual property.17
Property rights developed in the 18th century as one of the core civil rights parallel to-and mutually reinforcing-the right to life and the right to liberty.18 However, it can be argued that property is not a natural right but rather a deliberate construction by society in order to secure protection against pressure from the collective.19
Hence, property is justified as a foundation for liberty. As clearly proven by the Peruvian economist de Soto, property is an important asset for personal security, providing incentives for long-term investments, which are presumed to lead to 14 P. Drahos A problem related to unpredlctable property rights is the competition of property rights. It has been argued that, while tangible property rights easily cause conflict, as one person's property claim may conflict with another person's property claim, the same does not apply with regard to intangible property rights. It is held that "no patent can stop a person from continuing something he has done before".21 In an ideal world, where patent claims only cover what is actually new and invented, this observation might be true. Thus, all known and existing processes and products would (in this ideal world) not infringe the patent. However, it seems too nake to believe that all activities can continue as before.
At the least, the patent as an IPR may create some uncertainty with regard to which activities are acceptable and which activities might infiinge the patent. Most actors will have neither the insight to know nor the resources available to clarify--through administrative or judicial means-the boundaries between the intellectual property of the right holder and the public domain that is free for everyone to use.
A granted patent right is considered to fall within the scope of "possessions" in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. However, the European Court of Human Rights declined to give an opinion on whether a patent application constituted a possession within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The European Commission of Human Rights had already made a dlstinction between a patent application, on the one hand, and a vahd patent, on the other hand, and the Court summarized the findings of the Commission by stating that "the company was denied a protected intellectual property right but was not deprived of its existing property".22 Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that an intellectual property is not recognized as human rights-protected property per se before it is recognized through a grant by an administrative decision. This must be presumed to apply particularly to inventive intellectual efforts that are thought to be eligible for patent protection.
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS
There is no generally agreed definition of human rights. One could attempt to define the term as follows: "The freedoms, immunities and benefits that, accordlng to modern values, all human beings should be able to claim as a matter of right in the societies in which they live." Human rights are universal, and the individual, alone or in community with others, should enjoy the same rights. However, as not all States are parties to all human rights conventions, in practice an indvidual in a State which has ratified all human rights conventions can claim more rights than an indwidual in a State which has not ratified the same conventions.23
Human rights evolved from natural law and gradually became recognized nationally and then internationally, the latter in the second half of the 20th century.24 Human rights have been given a high normative status, as agreed in the Vienna Declaration: "All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. This right must be understood in relation to all other recognized human rights and cannot be exercised to the detriment of other human rights. The balancing of the rights is very evident in the Statement adopted by the Committee on Economic, Social and 23 However, it is also possible to claim that all recognized human rights are part of customary law and therefore applicable also in those States where the specific human rights treaty has not been ratified.
*4
The establishment of the International Labour Organization in 1919 led to a substantial strengthening of economic rights internationally through the adoption of conventions in the 1920s and 1930s. Thesc conventions were arguably important for the strengthening of economic human rights, but it is not obvious that they actually are human rights conventions.
25 Vienna Declaration and Programme ofAction, adopted 25 June 1993, A/CONF.157/23, 12 July 1993, para. 5. *6 The Universal Declaration on Human Rights, adopted 10 December 1948, rccognizes the human right to property in Article 17: "1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. 2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property." 29 Moreover, Article 27.2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes authors' rights: "Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production ofwhich he is the author." P. Buck, Geistiges Eigentum und V5Jkerrecht: Beitrage des V8kerrecht zur Fortentwicklung des Schufzes von yeistigem Eigentum, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1994, p. 242 , finds that the different wording of Articles 15.1(c) and 27.2 ("right to benefit from the protection" versus "right to the protection") implies that the scope of the right is different. The latter is more explicit in stating that protection is the only way in which the authors can be ensured their moral and material interests. Hence, it can be said that the primary right under Article 15.l(c) is to enjoy the benefits, not to be grantedprotection. This difference in wording should not be exaggerated. However, some find that human rights provisions actually imply that IPRS are recognized as human rights-even with fewer conditions than under standard patent law.33 It is reasoned here that this cannot be true and that the sparse wordmg of the human rights provisions cannot be used as an argument for any strengthening of IPRs. Rather, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides a delicate balance, implying that the moral and material interests of the author, as recognized in Article 15.1(c), are legitimate human rights only under certain specific conditions.34 rights and IPRS:
There are four arguments why authors of copyright-eligble productions, more than inventors of patent-eligible productions, should be considered to be protected by human rights:
(i) the wordmg of Article 15.l(c) is taken from the Beme Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Article 2(1), applying the term "production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain";
(ii) the life-long protection of copyrights (Article 7(1) of the Berne Convention sets the term at "the life of the author and fifty years after his death") is much more compatible with human rights than the instrumental period of patent protection of twenty years;
30 The Committee was established in accordance with resolution E/REs/1985/17 and consists of eighteen members, acting independently of governments. The members are elected for four years and can be re-elected once. The examination of repom of State parties is the main activity of the Committee, and the adoption of statements and general comments serves "to suggest improvements in the reporring procedures and to stimulate the activities of the State parties, international organizations and specialized agencies"; U.N. Doc. E/1989/22, General Comment No. 1 (Introduction), para. 3, 87.
31 See Statement, supra, footnote 1, para. 6. 32 Ibid., para. 12. The relevant rights recognized in the Covenant against which Article 15.l(c) must be balanced are Article 2.2 (prohibition against discrimination), Article 7(a) (the right to remuneration for worken), Article 11 (the right to adequate food), Article 12 (the right to the highest attainable standard of health), Article 15.l(a) (the right to take part in cultural life) and Article 15.l(b) (the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications).
(iii) only those "intellectual rights" whch have their content close to human dignity should be recognized as human rights;35 and (iv) the travatrx prkparatoires of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights indcate that the drafters primanly thought of copyright-related work as f d n g withn human rights protection; the term "patent" is used only once during the negotiations in the Third Committee of the General Assembly.36
In conclusion, IPRS could constitute human rights in so far as the enjoyment of these rights contributes to secure the moral and/or material interests of the author (copyrights) or inventor (patents or industrial property rights) .37
V. DISTINCTIONS AMONG HUMAN RIGHTS
The third objection against considering patents as human rights, referred to in the previous Section, will now be analysed in more detail. As a basis for this analysis, it must be stressed that while IPRS might constitute human rights there is a distinction that must be made between rights linked directly to the human person and rights which contribute to the realization of other human rights.
This analysis is not an attempt to build a hierarchy among ddferent human rights.
All human rights must be based on the principles established at the World Conference of Human Rights: "All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated."3* Moreover, it is obvious that, particularly among the human rights recognized in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the realization of one right contributes directly to the realization of other human rights. This is especially so with the right to health, a right which is made more &ficult to enjoy if the right to adequate food or adequate housing is not realized.39 
(c).
36 See Official Records of the 1957 negotiations in the General Assembly's Third Committee, A/C.3/SR.798, para. 44, 184, when the USSR talked about "copyrights and patents" as not appropriate for inclusion in the paragraph. 37 Whether Article 25.l(c) says that the protection of the rights ofthe inventor-through patents-hould be considered less important than the protection of the rights of the author-through copyrights-1s an unresolved issue. The Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights seems to inkcate that there is a distinction but does not make ths distinction explicit. However, note para. 10 of Resolution E/CN.4/Sub.2/REs/ 200112, c&ng for an examination of the compatibility between patents and the protection and promotion of human rights. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights does not indicate that there is such a distinction in its Statement, supra, footnote 1. There are certain human rights which should be valued precisely because they contribute to the enjoyment of-and form an integral part of-an adequate standard of living. These rights are the right of workers to adequate remuneration, as recognized in Article 7(a) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the right to property, as recognized in Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and the material aspect of authors' rights, as recognized in Article 15.l(c) ofthe Covenant. These rights are not directly linked to the human person but are nonetheless of value, as they could form a necessary basis for the reahation of other human rights.40
The moral and material interests of the authors of literary, artistic and scientific productions should therefore be recognized as human rights. However, the caution expressed in the (now withdrawn) German Draft on IPRS, saying that IPRS do not per se represent human rights, merits more attenti0n.4~ The following sentence therein was put in brackets: "Intellectual property rights are basic human property rights."42 However, neither the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights nor the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights has substantively challenged the perception that IPRS are human rights.43
Concerning the enjoyment of the recognized human rights, it is an established principle that the enjoyment of one human right shall not negatively affect the enjoyment of other human rights.44 The challenge is to identifj under what circumstances the inconsistency principle of the Committee applies with regard to IPRs.~~ It is presumed that two conditions must be met if intellectual property protection is found to be inconsistent with human rights protection. Under such circumstances, authors' rights-as rights which should be assessed based on the extent to which they contribute to the fulfillment of other human rights-should be enjoyed only so long as other basic human rights are not further impeded.46
The first condition is that those primarily benefiting from the protection of moral and material interests are not human persons but, rather, corporate entities. The second condition is that those who are primanly bearing the burden of stronger protection of 4o This is also the argument put forth by the Quakers; see supra, footnote 2: "The means of fulfilling human L. 861, 2002, pp. 867-868. 45 Refer to para. 6 of the Statement, supra, footnote 1, saying that "any intellectual property regime that makes it more difficult for a State to comply with its core obligations in relation to health, food, education . . . is inconsistent with the legally binding obligations of the State party." 46 A problem with this approach is that the potentially positive impacts of intellectual property protection are not usually seen immediately but only after some period of time, resulting in increased creativity and innovation. These dynamic effects should also be considered, but this is not easy in a human rights assessment.
rights obligations should not be confused with the human rights themselves." moral and material interests are the less afRuent segments of society. This is because the most vulnerable and hsadvantaged segments of society are given particular attention in the supervision of the implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.47
Authors' rights, as recognized in Article 15.1 (c) of the Covenant, can therefore be considered to be human rights, but only if the recognition, promotion and protection of these rights actually contribute to a better enjoyment of human rights, both for the author and for those enjoying the productions of the author. If social human rights, such as the right to food or health, are impeded as a result of the enjoyment of authors' rights, the rights which are related to the protection of the human person per se must be considered more important than the rights which are related to the moral and material interests of that person.48
Thus, there is a hstinction among human rights, more specifically between those rights which contribute to the realization of other rights and the rights which hrectly relate to the protection of the human person. While authors' rights as recognized in Article 15.l(c) of the Covenant belong to the former category, it is obvious that any restriction of this right should only be made after careful consideration. In particular, the basic principle of non-discrimination, as well as the principles of participation, transparency and accountability, should be carefully observed.
Finally, it cannot be excluded that the survival of a person may directly depend upon receiving benefits from hidher writing or inventions. In such situations, human rights protection of the author of artistic or scientific work is of crucial importance.
VI. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN IPRS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Based on the arguments above, the notion that IPRS are human rights should be qualified. The instrumental, short-term character of patent rights, in particular, implies that these rights are fundamentally different from the rights which all human beings are entitled to by birth and which are not granted by a public authority. Does this then justify the notion that patent rights first and foremost should be understood as privileges? The main difference in presenting the term "privileges" is that this was an instrument that was applied in the pre-capitalist era of mercantilism. During this period, the instrumental policy of the competing European States was to secure 48 Article 60.5 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties implies that certain treaties are of a particular kind. The paragraph reads: "Paragraphs 1 to 3 [regarding termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as a consequence of its breach] do not apply to provisions relating to the protection of the human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian character, in particular to provisions prohibiting any form of reprisals against persons protected by such treaties." From the travaux priparatoires, it is clear that the term "treaties of a humanitarian character" also refers to human rights treaties.
certain benefits vis-d-vis other States. One such policy was the granting of privileges. In the modem era, the patent right is a right that a person is entitled to if certain objective criteria are met. However, there is no doubt that State authorities decide upon their patent laws based upon subjective assessments of what is most beneficial to them in social and economical terms. Hence, this modem patent system is based on certain standards of objectivity.
It can easily be shown that patent rights are subject to specific conditions and limitations. As already mentioned, the term of protection is limited and subject to the annual payment of fees. Moreover, the rights are not absolute, as the State authorities can decide to issue a compulsory licence, allowing a person other than the patent holder to produce the patented product.49 The fact that a patent right is granted does not prevent the issue of a compulsory licence, provided that certain conditions, such as the payment of remuneration to the patent holder, are met.
O n the other hand, if the chscussion is at a higher level, the procedure for the grant and enforcement of patents inmcates that patent rights are of a particular kind. First, the right is granted by a public authority, such as a Patent Office. The Patent Office issues patents based only on those patent claims which are found to fulfil the eligibility criteria. Second, the issuance of a compulsory licence implies that the rights might be subordmate to specific public interests. Third, the patent does not entail full ownership of the invention, but is limited to its commercial exploitation. Anyone can undertake research on the patented invention. Fourth, a right is commonly perceived as a claim that one can make on the holder of the corresponding obligation, most commonly the State. However, it is the patent holder-and not the authorities-which is responsible for enforcing the rights in a situation of alleged infiingement. State authorities are only responsible for making available the mechanisms and institutions necessary for effective enforcement.
Based on the arguments above, it is found that neither the "privilege" concept nor the "rights" concept is fully appropriate to describe the particular nature of a patent. The objective character of a patent clearly confhcts with the subjective character of a privilege. Moreover, at a more practical level, the older perception of patents in the form of privileges is not likely to be welcomed by the central actors; it is highly unlikely that any attempt to replace the term "intellectual property right" by "intellectual property privilege" wdl succeed. There are also certain common characteristics of a "right" which do not apply to the particular characteristics of a patent right, as shown above. While the patent right per 5e has an objective element, the strength of the right is highly subjective. The strength of the patent right is wholly dependent on how the rights of the right holder are exercised. While enjoyment of human rights is to some extent affected by the active involvement of the right holders, this requirement of active involvement applies even more so in the field of patent rights. For the effective exercise of the right, the patent right holder retains the sole responsibility to halt any alleged violation or infringement of this right-by bringing the case before adrmnistrative or legal competent bodies, alternatively through bilateral agreements or cross-licensing.
VII. ANOTHER APPROACH TO PATENT RIGHTS
A more appropriate understanding of what a patent entails comes closer to the perception of rights which involves power.50 A brief analysis of this concept of power applied to patent rights is the following. A patent right involves the ability to change legal arrangements, including the right to transfer a right to a licensee which operates with the consent of the patent holder. This must be considered as an undisputed characteristic of patent rights.
Hence, the holder of the patent right has the power to define how and in relation to whom to exercise this right. The patent holder can freely decide that public non-commercial use or use by small-holders will not be subject to accusations of infringement, u d k e commercial use by other corporate actors. The patent right holder can also decide to exercise the rights in a strict manner, filing court cases for alleged infringements based on available evidence. Therefore, it seems that power is heavily involved in the exercise of patent rights. Without power, including legal and financial capabilities, the patent holder would have &fficulties in exercising the granted rights, defending these rights from infringements.
Based on this perception, the understanlng that patents primarily belong to international economic law and not to international human rights law is also more evident. This perception would probably be a better way forward to identify the potential threats of an excessive reliance upon patent rights, lscussing the conditions under which the granting of patent rights could lead to abuse of power. 50 See Campbell and Thomas, supro, footnote 11, pp. 12-31; see also Waldron, supm, footnote 1 1 , p. 7. According to Hohfeld, there are four different categories of rights: rights as unrestricted actions (liberty, privilege or freedom); rights as claim-rights uts-d-uis the holder of the obligation; rights as power to alter existing legal arrangements (ability): and rights as immunity from legal change. This fourth category is not considered in detail here, but the following should be observed: A new patent granted must be considered as a legal change if this patent affects an original patent: however, no patent holder is immune from the grant of a patent for any subsequent invention which fulfils the eligibility requirements-even if the results are that the first patent loses its commercial value.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This article has demonstrated that no conceptual amendment can be expected where the term "privilege" is preferred to the term "right" in relation to intellectual property. The term "privilege" has too many negative connotations, which the advocates for intellectual property protection would be careful to avoid.
At the same time, the term "right" as it is applied in the field of intellectual property is substantially different from the term "right" as applied in the field of human rights. The unfortunate attempts by the World Intellectual Property Organization to equate IPKS and human rights must be challenged. The nature of human rights is substantially different from the nature of IPRs-the former emphasizing provision and access, the latter emphasizing exclusion and control.
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has taken upon itself this task of distinguishing human rights from IPRS in the drafting of a General Comment on Article 15.l(c) of the Covenant regarding the right of everyone to "benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author". However, it remains to be seen whether the Committee decides to present other distinctions, in line with the Draft proposed by the German Chapter of the International Law Association.
